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Abstract 
There is a growing body of research on resistance in IS projects, a good deal of which focuses on 
strategies for overcoming resistance.  However, within this strand of research, it appears that there is 
a ‘blanket prescription’ approach that does not account for diversity in resistance reasoning.  We 
offer a qualitative study of the response of diverse actors to a pilot of a custom developed client 
tracking information system, which brought about diverse covert and overt resistance activities. This 
empirical research is used to explore the heterogeneous user and how such a ‘blanket prescription’ to 
avert organisational-wide resistance went wrong and how resistance succeeded.  This paper aims to 
contribute to the body of existing literature on IS user resistance by emphasizing the injurious 
continuous error of excluding such constructs as the heterogeneous user within user resistance 
research. 
Keywords: User Resistance, User Participation, Organisational Change, Strategic Management of 
Systems Development. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
The issue of user resistance is a key strategic consideration in IS projects.  Indeed, there has been a 
significant body of literature examining the complexities of user resistance in IS projects dating back 
several decades (Keen 1981; Dickson and Simmons 1970). Attention has been given to the reasons for 
resistance and strategies to resolve this phenomenon yet there is still no widespread conformity on 
how to successfully tackle this continuing issue (Hirschheim and Newman 1988). Whilst emphasis has 
been placed on investigating the link between user acceptance and user resistance (Davis 1989; 
Venkatesh et al 2003; Delone and McLean 1992; Wong and Tate 1994), much of this work ignores (or 
turns a blind eye) to the heterogeneous, situated nature of users (Lamb and Kling, 2003) and with that 
the further nuance of system purpose (Jiang et al 2000).  Additionally there is a lack of attention to the 
potential tensions between different users affected by the development and implementation process 
which if addressed would focus the lens somewhat upon the heterogeneous user (Markus 1983, and 
Wong and Tate 1994).  Yet, it seems reasonable to highlight that users reactions, intentions and 
behaviour may differ if a system type is mandatory, voluntary, hedonic and based on user 
characteristics such as level within any given organisational hierarchy (Marakus and Hornik 1996; 
Barki and Huff 1985; van der Heijden 2004; Jiang et al 2000; Butler and Fitzgerald 1997). With this in 
mind, our study is concerned with the idea that organisational actors involved in technological change 
are not a homogeneous group but rather a group of users belonging to distinct groupings, each with 
their own organisational agendas, personal agendas and societal worldviews. In this paper, against a 
backdrop of user resistance in an IS context, we aim to explore this further by drawing upon a case 
study of a pilot of a custom developed customer relationship management system.  In doing this we 
point to the need to consider the heterogeneous resistant user and how a blanket prescription based 
strategy for overcoming resistance simultaneously proved problematic for change agents whilst it 
became a conduit for successful resistance for various organisational actors.  The paper opens by 
briefly considering the nature of user resistance within an IS context. This exploration was edifying in 
highlighting some problems and limitations of the resultant ‘blanket prescription’ strategies designed 
for overcoming resistance, and these failings are further discussed. In the following section we present 
an interpretation of the findings from a case study of the responses of diverse actors involved in an IS 
pilot project which brought about diverse covert and overt resistance activities. Finally conclusions are 
drawn which centre on providing insights into why a ‘blanket prescription’ strategy to avert 
organisational-wide resistance went wrong and how user resistance succeeded.  In sum, we argue this 
is because the generic, prescriptive strategy for overcoming resistance deployed by the Managing 
Director (MD) did not account for the diversity in resistance strategies employed by various 
organisational actors. 
2 USER RESISTANCE AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS 
Users of IS often respond in different ways to technological changes (Dickson and Simmons 1970), 
ranging from total rejection, to a moderate rejection of some of its functionality (Markus 1983; Doolin 
2004), demonstrated resistance (Hirschheim and Newman 1988), passive resistance (Marakas and 
Hornik 1996), or reluctant begrudging acceptance (Brown et al 2002; Jiang et al 200). Resistance is 
therefore a reaction or a symptom (Hirschheim and Newman 1988), an indicator of users attempting to 
realign the change process, and if it is not considered it can undermine the system implementation 
efforts and result in failure. In a general context, resistance can be understood as the intentional acts of 
commission or omission that defy the wishes of others (Ashforth and Mael 1998; Newman 1989). 
More specifically, in an organisational context, we can view resistance as the activities or intentions 
through which those in organisations seek to oppose official and unofficial forms of control (Gabriel 
2000, Newman 1989, Marakas and Hornik 1996).  In an IS context, this might be exemplified as the 
negative behaviour of system users that may prevent system designers achieving their objectives and, 
ultimately, system implementation (Markus, 1983).  
 
The study, and practice of, user resistance is diverse in nature, as we shall now explore further.  Some 
recognise that any resistant behaviour to IS which exhibits itself in overt manner (Marakas and Hornik 
1996; Keen 1981; King and Anderson 1995; Newman 1989) is generally thought to be dysfunctional 
(Newman 1989) motivated by crime or personal gain (Hirschheim and Newman 1988) oral 
defamation, refusal to use the system (Martinko et al 1996) and involves active sabotage and 
destruction of hardware (Martinko et al 1996).  Marakas and Hornik (1996) further argue that users 
may engage in destructive behaviour in an attempt to regain a control over their environment so that 
they are not at the mercy of the new technology. Others recognise that resistant behaviour to IS can be 
passive and covert (Lauer and Rajagopalan 2003; Marakas and Hornik 1996; King and Anderson 
1995). Here, the passive resister may resentfully accept the system, customising working practices, 
silently scheming to conspire in its downfall with a hidden agenda (Moyniham 2002).  They may 
exhibit acceptance like behaviour and use this to mask acts of resistance.  These styles of resistance 
are hard to detect (Newman 1989).  Users may reluctantly accept (Brown et al 2002), divert and 
challenge imposed systems and rules (Doolin 2004), and purposely use a system in a minimal fashion 
(Martinko et al 1996). Thus, resistance can be overt and covert, active and passive.   
 
The debate whether user resistance is either a positive or a negative construct is ongoing within the IS 
community (Friedman and Cornford, 1989; Wilson 1999; Grover et all, 1988).  Some recognise the 
concept of resistance as being functional, positive, and a legitimate behavioural response to 
technological change (Hirschheim and Newton 1988), a rational response by a rational user to 
dysfunctional or flawed technologies that require redesign or restructuring (Davis et al 1992; Martinko 
et al 1996; Marakas et al 1996)).  However is argued that it is also, most usually seen as a negative 
dysfunctional activity that requires eradication or neutralising (Hirschheim and Newman’s 1989).  As 
King and Anderson (1995) state, resistance is wholly in the eye of the beholder.  The beholder is 
usually those trying to deal with resistance, rather than those who are performing it. Resistance is 
typically seen as a problem of the resistors (Friedman and Cornford, 1989; Grover et all, 1988; 
Newman 1989) but Lyytinen’s (1988) empirical investigation into IS failures is studied from a 
management viewpoint and Newman (1989) focuses the phenomenon through the IS practitioner 
viewpoint.  Jiang et al (1997) also highlight the importance of taking into account other stakeholders 
perceptions in IS projects, arguing that ‘failures associated with IS development, users and IS 
professionals do indeed have differing perceptions’ (Jiang et all 1997:936). Thus, depending upon the 
perspective taken, resistance can be seen as functional and dysfunctional.  Of course the reasons for 
the occurrence of resistance are similarly lacking homogeneity, IS related change is argued to embody 
a lack of familiarity, altering relationships, working patterns, and communication channels threatening 
perceived status, power and authority (Keen 1981; Grover 1988; Markus and Pfeffer 1983). Also 
resistance is often a response to the re-distribution of information, the breaking down of established 
monopolies equating to the dissolution of existing power structures (Keen 1981; Markus 1983 Katz 
and Kahn 1978), whilst, there is research that focuses upon reasons for resistance, the predominant 
reason is the resistor’s pathological fear of change (Friedman and Cornford, 1989; Selwyn 2003; 
Hirschheim et all 1988). 
 
Thus, there is a great deal of diversity in the way that resistance is conceptualised and enacted.  Where 
resistance is seen as an issue that needs to be dealt with, then there are various strategies to overcome 
resistance are deployed. Jiang, Muhanna et al. (2000) report on a variety of strategies that researchers 
have identified to overcome resistance, which they classify into two groupings: participative and 
directive. Participative strategies are ‘user friendly’ and focus upon training, building support 
structures, releasing adequate resources; architecting an optimistic environment.  The directive 
strategies are practical ‘business driven solutions’ and focus upon financial incentives for use of 
system, user rights directives, role modifications, power redistribution, top management support, job 
status modification, and job counselling but ultimately job elimination for those who do not want to 
learn to use the new system. We have yet to find prescriptions and methods for encouraging 
resistance!  What is noticeable are the generic prescriptions and examples of non-specific guidelines 
and/or generic solutions for indistinct users (Keen 1981; Markus 1981; Moyniham 2003) with blanket 
strategies for predicting (Kettinger 2002), pre-empting (Martinko et al. 1996) and over-coming (Keen 
1981) resistance. Yet, given so much diversity in the conceptualisation and enactment of resistance – it 
is overt/covert, functional/dysfunctional, and acted out for a myriad of reasons, then it is surprising 
that the strategies deployed are not as diverse.  With this in mind, we now further investigate the 
problems of deploying blanket strategies for overcoming diverse acts of resistance, through a case 
study of a pilot IT project.  
3 BACKGROUND AND RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
Our case is an expanding Management Consultancy small to medium enterprise ‘Jarman1’ that at the 
time of this investigation was experiencing an accelerated growth, the company quadrupled in size, 
expanding from two-sites to a six-site operation with a national UK coverage. ICT investment was 
seen as a significant strategic issue - to support the expanding organisation. The IT project we discuss 
here concerns the pilot of a custom, in-house developed application to support and monitor the 
progress of a client through their process of mentoring and networking. This work is part of a wider 
case study of user resistance within the same organisation (Craig-Smith, 1990; Walsham 1995).  We 
chose the single case approach as we agree with Darke et al’s (1998) view that single cases allow 
researchers to investigate phenomena in depth in order to provide rich description and understanding. 
For this part of the case study, multiple techniques of data collection were used, the most predominant 
being participant and non-participant observation and formal and informal interviews.  One of the 
                                              
1 to pseudonym 
researchers was based on site full-time as a researcher for two years as part of a Teaching Company 
Scheme.  Another researcher attended the organisation in support of the project at least one day per 
week for the two years – we were highly engaged researchers (Nandhakumar and Jones, 1997).  We 
both observed and participated in the project from the requirement gathering stage and through to 
implementation and attempted use.  This enabled very rich insights - as each version of the pilot 
scheme was presented reactions and responses were gathered. Once the pilot scheme became live, the 
mandatory activity was monitored on a daily basis in addition the accumulating diverse resistance 
strategies deployed.  In addition historical documentation was made available together with unlimited 
access to the new client tracking system documentation. A thorough contextualisation exercise was 
enabled which lends this empirical data more depth as interrelationships and behavioural patterns 
could be observed. What this investigation allowed us to witness was the termination of the pilot 
scheme due to user resistance success.  This study presents the opportunity to observe a multifarious 
user group resisting technology induced change and also provide empirical evidence as related to the 
utility of the blanket prescription so often put forward by those theories that conceptualise resistance 
as pathological, problematic and unnecessary rather than symptomatic, educational and useful. 
Attention has been exerted in developing the case data in more depth to ensure that readers may 
achieve a genuine empathy with the organisational actors involved. The authors are aware that this 
may result in allocation issues in other components of the research process to be perceived as ‘gently’ 
lacking for more description but in this instance the case data is highly relevant in justifying the 
overall argument.   
 
4 CASE STUDY FINDINGS 
Jarman is a management consultancy that works with senior executives to find them new roles when 
they have been made redundant.  It does this through processes of mentoring and networking 
facilitated by a personal executive career consultant.  This working relationship between consultants 
and Jarman is very informal with clients being allocated on an as and when basis. It is a mutually 
dependent relationship where the implicit and explicit connections blur because once the client 
procedure starts and the initial basic contact and contract details have been recorded and centrally 
stored, the continuing client information is stored by and kept externally with the consultant. The 
rationale has always been that client information maybe of a sensitive nature so should be stored 
securely but this procedure is becoming problematic as the company expands and the client base 
grows. In order to manage the existing process, regular updates (were supposed to be) submitted by 
the consultants (either by e-mail, written and sometimes verbally) to administrators for entry onto the 
client system. The process is and always has been problematic because of the tension between Jarman 
management needing progress data about clients and consultants not wanting to give too much 
information away. It was felt that situation required investment, not a simple financial infusion but 
time for changes to embedded ad hoc working practices. A decision was made, reluctantly but 
perceptively by the Managing Director to further develop the existing IT support and in doing so 
centralise and formalise the process.  Once those changes had been established and accepted a second 
stage was planned, to enable consultants to securely enter client details directly onto the system. An 
enterprise wide package was being selected for implementation in a years’ time and thus, there was a 
twelve month window to undertake preparatory incremental change. A pilot scheme was set up, newly 
designed forms, training sessions, written guidelines and improved reporting functionality was added 
to existing client system. The team conducting the pilot were available on a daily basis for all the 
stakeholders involved in the client process and update the MD on a fortnightly basis. Our investigation 
centres on examining how a diverse user group reacted to the pilot which involved altering a decade of 
embedded working practices.  
 
5 THE ORGANISATIONAL ACTORS 
The users included a broad spectrum of staff from the administrative, through middle management and 
to director level.  Each had agendas, concerns and dilemmas when confronted with mandatory 
involvement in the pilot project. Table 1 below details the organisational actors’ roles with respect to 
the existing system and what was required of them throughout the pilot study and the hieratical status 
that they hold. The timings of the pilot study were flexible because an objective was to alter embedded 
behaviour and it was a mutually agreed that a rigid timeframe maybe too restrictive. However, the 
pilot was not a new idea sprung upon the actors, there was documentary evidence that discussion and 
meetings had taken place for over the last decade of how to capture client data. Senior Management 
were aware that opposition and confrontation would be the universal response to the planned changes.  
This was confirmed by the reaction of the actors involved in the requirement gathering stage and 
reiterated when the Administrator reported that from the onset the pilot was being avoided. In response 
the MD devised a naming and shaming strategy in an attempt to overcome resistance and ensure that 
the pilot would be a success. The naming and shaming strategy worked as follows.  Under the 
direction of the MD, the Administrator was given a form by the project team which contained key 
milestones in the provision of service provided to clients. These milestones were linked to particular 
organisational actors. The administrator was instructed to report anyone who did not complete, or, 
inform her that they had completed any given milestone, as it should be. On a weekly basis this 
‘report’ was made into a list and given to the MD. He would then circulate that list throughout the 
company, via e-mail, to all staff and external consultants thus naming and shaming people who were 
perceived as resisters. The strategy continued for 4 weeks and it was discontinued at this point as 
everyone had been named. The strategy had not worked as people were still resisting en-mass, the use 
of the modified system. We will now explore further why the strategy failed and the resistors 
succeeded by considering particular organisational actors responses to the naming and shaming 
strategy. In ease case we begin by explaining their role as related to the system and consider what they 
are resisting, why and how. We then highlight why the blanket strategy of naming and shaming didn’t 
work.      
 
Organisational Actors Current role with the existing system Role in the pilot study 
Administrator 
(supporting role to Sales 
Director and  
Consultants, no 
managerial 
responsibilities)  
Role involved keeping database current, 
often required to answer analytical 
requests, maintain factually correct data 
for monthly board reports.  
They currently enter key data onto a 
database from paper forms, e-mails, 
verbal instructions and personally seeking 
data directly from clients  
Monitor the usage of pilot system, 
report and collect instances of misuse. 
The role was to police all activity, 
naming individuals that did not conform 
which meant reporting more senior 
people to their superiors (Not a natural 
role but some enjoyed the power) 
Management Director 
(MD) 
Reporting only to the 
Chairman of the Board)  
Little input but as the founder was closely 
involved with the current design so 
demonstrated parochial issues 
If Administrator was police then the 
MD was judge, jury and executor 
Consultants 
Self Employed but 
highly respected a 
Managing Consultant 
representing them on 
the Board) 
 
Supplying data to administrator via a 
paper based form which should be 
completed with the client on the first 
meeting (this then triggers the financial 
process and an invoice should be sent to 
the clients previous employer) 
The pilot study was an attempt to 
change working practices by 
encouraging the release of client data, 
the timely inputs of data and ultimately 
exposure to new process of data entry 
but firstly paper based 
Sales Directors 
(Reporting to a 
Regional Director but 
hold position on the 
Board, also Head 
specialist interest 
Their role is to conduct the introductory 
client meeting and start the New Client 
Form (NCF), which also includes the 
client’s details and also importantly the 
product which has been sold. This 
ultimately determines the length of time, 
Meet with the client and start the (NCF) 
must include client program. This is 
where they stop contact with the client 
(there are many instances of NCFs not 
being started so no –one is aware that 
the client is requiring consultancy 
groups) which band of research activities, the 
class of care 
sessions 
Table 1: Heterogeneous user group 
 
5.1 The Administrator  
Historically, the administrator was the member of staff who usually inputted new client data into the 
existing database.  The data came from a new client form that was completed by a consultant and 
handed to her.  With the implementation of the pilot, additional data also had to be input into the 
system, and moreover, consultants were expected to input there own data wherever possible. The 
administrator resisted the pilot for a number of reasons because she had to input extra data into the 
system and her power base was being eroded. These were points of resistance because a) she had to 
undertake additional work and b) because, prior to the pilot, she was the only person in the 
organisation that had access to client data on the computer.  The implication of the latter being, that 
her role might eventually be made redundant or changed significantly, particularly as related to the 
downgrading of her status. In terms of her resistance strategy, she vocalised, and exaggerated, the 
instances of incorrect data entry by others, and continually highlighted the fact that other people could 
cause big problems if they were allowed access to the system.  Thus she created an atmosphere of 
uncertainty surrounding the pilot. The blanket prescription of naming and shaming did not over come 
her resistance activities because her role she wanted to put the data in so she was never going to be 
shamed.  Indeed, she compiled the naming and shaming list, and this actually supported part of her 
strategy of resistance – to show that other people being involved would make the system fall down. 
 
5.2 The Consultants 
This group of actors were powerful members - being self-employed allowed them some protection 
from company protocols. New clients were matched with consultants based on their skills and 
expertise and they were paid monthly usually regardless of how often they met with the client, 
payment ending once the client became recruited. The majority of client data related to, collected 
during and required for the recruitment campaign was stored off-site with the consultants, they 
submitted monthly reports about their clients to the Administrator and she inputted the data onto the 
existing system, but this was on an ad-hoc basis, in different formats and any immediate client up-
dates was usually only collected verbally. However, the pilot required all client-consultant recruitment 
activities, CV, networking, speculative letters, and such details to be captured and that all  client 
meetings be logged centrally. The Consultants resisted the perceived monitoring, they did not want 
their client-consultant activities scrutinised.  Currently they were managing the recruitment campaign, 
and they did not want to share their knowledge or expertise. They resisted the pilot because there 
powerful positions were under threat and they were also required to contribute to this threat by 
imputing the data themselves. Reasons for resistance were apprehension of a reduction in power and 
perceived status, a dilution of their knowledge, the current private client relationship was to become 
public and all meetings logged which may impact on their fees if the quota was not met.  Moreover 
many of them anticipated having to do what they saw as the non-paid ‘secretarial’ work of inputting 
data into the ‘final’ enterprise system and this was not part of their role. There was also a real fear of 
the new technology, the consultants were predominately near retirement age and some were IT literate. 
Conspiring with each other, the Consultants became a imposing force, adding extra alarmed voices by 
highlighting inadequacies and shortcomings of the pilot and the new procedures, by questioning the 
confidentially and security risks of centralising highly sensitive private data. The Consultants tactic 
was to ignore initial attempts to demand this information of them until they were directly asked or 
coerced into to providing it (that is, potentially through loss of client contracts). However, the pilot 
scheme dissolved before this stage was reached in earnest.  A further tactic was avoidance and 
distraction by creating a chaotic problematic situation when they seemed to be attempting to enter data 
onto the system .  This was helped enormously by the fact that Consultants had to share PCs with part-
time staff members.  Thus, they claimed they could not access the system when they needed to, and 
that when they did, it didn’t work.  They also began to demand formal training (which they new would 
take time and resource to organise).  In addition, increasingly, the Consultants arranged meetings away 
from the office to further avoid confrontation regarding the pilot. The name and shame strategy failed 
predominantly because, the consultants could not be shamed into entering the data, because they were 
self employed (and in fact many also worked for one of Jarman’s competitors).  Thus, the consultants 
were empowered not to respond to this kind of coercion.  Moreover, an added difficulty for the MD 
was that most of the consultants were nearing retirement age anyway, and so would not have been so 
worried had more extreme measures been taken, such as non-renewal of contracts.  The consultants, in 
short, would not be intimidated because of the balance of power relations between them and those at 
Jarman.   
 
5.3 The Sales Directors  
The Sales Directors’ roles in the client tracking process was to conduct an introductory meeting with 
the new clients and match them with a Consultant. This involved arranging a meeting at the company 
premises where they would start a new client record.  Basic contact data was collected alongside the 
details of what service level the client purchased. This data collection was very informal, sometimes 
completed on a paper and handed to the Administrator for inputting.  Sometimes it was  e-mailed  but 
in some cases the Administrator would be told to collect the required information on the second client 
visit as the Sales people were to busy at the introductory meeting. This might mean the client services 
team did not find out about a new client for some times leading to a delay in service provision.  The 
pilot was supposed to deal with this problem.   However, The sales team were Directors so there was 
an immediate resistance to the requests that formalised the  structure of their work.   Moreover, the 
anticipated extra workload of populating the pilot with mandatory data was completely frowned upon 
because of the additional work and the fact that many were not IT literate.  A further issue was that the 
directors did not  want explicit details of the deals made between themselves and the client being 
publicised via the system because although services were standardised variations in pricing and the 
configuration of the service was done at the client level based on what the sales director thought it 
would take to finalise the deal.  This kind of knowledge was very much a source of power for this 
group.  Finally, the sales directors deemed themselves above data entry activity, seeing it as secretarial 
work.  Moreover, the were completely against the idea of being policed by a subordinate staff 
member. The Administrator who was appointed the person to ‘police’ the pilot was placed in a 
dubious position having to inform on her superiors to their superiors.  The name and shame strategy 
did not work with the sales directors primarily because they were senior members of staff who felt 
they could legitimately resist.  However, because these were senior staff their position was used to 
avoid being named and shamed by resisting covertly as well as overtly.  These staff made the 
Administrator enter their data for them.  Ironically, the Administrator was happy to do this as it 
supported her, in her resistance strategy.  Yet, even if she had not been happy to do this, it is likely she 
would have done anyway – because they were her superiors. 
 
5.4 Discussion 
We have provided insights into the organisational actors’ motives and mechanisms for resisting and 
also insights into why the name and shame strategy did not work. We show that there is diversity in 
what these actors were resisting, why and how.  This analysis goes someway to explaining why the 
blanket strategy failed.  In summary, the blanket prescription strategy did not allow for any 
demarcation of the actors involved in resistance activities nor did it attempt to facilitate an 
understanding of why these senior professionals, external Consultants and administration staff resisted.  
The case of the administrator demonstrates how a strategy for overcoming resistance might actually be 
consistent with, and even reinforce a certain individual, or groups resistance strategy.  The more 
people who were listed on the naming and shaming list, the better for the administrator as it supported 
her view that the system should be left to her.  The underlying assumption was that the existing system 
worked, why change it?  The case of the consultants shows how some groups may not respond to a 
particular strategy because they are not intimidated by it.   Underlying a lack of intimidation of course, 
are a complex set of power relations which the name and shame strategy just did not take account of.   
This was also the case with  the sales directors.  However, the case of the sales directors also illustrates 
the fact that the name and shame strategy really was configured for overt resistance – the obvious 
behaviours associated with NOT using the new system.  It did not account for covert resistance where 
the sales directors avoided being named and shamed by passing their work over to the Administrator.  
Combined, the cases also show how, intended or otherwise, diverse acts of resistance might reinforce 
each other.  The sales directors passing their work to the administrator, the consultants’ protests 
regarding the problems of the system and their demands for training all went some way to supporting 
the Administrator  in her efforts to keep existing practices.  In the end, all of the strategies worked as 
the pilot was withdrawn, temporarily at least. 
 
6 CONCLUSION  
Resistance is clearly a strategic consideration in any IS project and there is a pressing need to 
understand the area further.  There is need for a broader perspective of this multifaceted phenomenon 
and a continuing insistence from academia that a better understanding of resistance will lead to 
enhanced, informed strategies for working with it (Markus 1983; Lauer and Rajagopalan 2003). Prior 
work recognised diversity in the conceptualisation and enactment of resistance, yet it appears that 
strategies for ‘dealing with’ resistance as prescribed in the literature, and deployed in practice (as our 
case shows) seem to lack sufficient attention to this.  We have therefore investigated this matter 
further and have offered insights into the failure of a blanket strategy deployed to overcome diverse 
resistance strategies.  The result being the ‘failure’ of a pilot project and claims of success for the 
resistors.  How long lived this will be remains to be seen, the company in question is in the process of 
deploying the enterprise system.  The purpose of this paper is descriptive rather than prescriptive 
which why there are no specific guidelines or recommendations emerging from the case study 
findings. However, in sum, it is clear that when attempting to answer the why and how questions of IS 
resistance, attention should be given to the heterogeneity of user groups and their responses to 
different aspects of IS development, which will only contribute to a richer understanding of the 
phenomenon.   
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